Why Luck Egalitarianism cannot uphold Justice in Health

quarta-feira 27 de Julho de 2011, por Lasse Nielsen

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Abstract

In his most recent works, Shlomi Segall argues for a luck egalitarian approach to justice in health. Concurring with the thoughts of G. A. Cohen he defends the idea that it is unfair for individuals to be worse off than others due to outcomes that it would not be reasonable to expect them to avoid. In his defense of the luck egalitarian approach he argues against the criticism raised by Norman Daniels that luck egalitarianism is in some way too narrow and in another too wide to uphold justice in health and health care distribution. Instead he suggests a pluralistic outline of luck egalitarianism. In this article I argue that Segall’s defense of the application of luck egalitarianism to justice in health is inadequate. First of all, he has not sufficiently showed that luck egalitarianism applies well to health distributions above a threshold of basic needs. Secondly, his defense against Elizabeth Anderson’s abandonment objection is problematic from a luck egalitarian standpoint. Finally, I argue that luck egalitarianism in general fails to acknowledge the moral foundation of health and health care as a basic human entitlement. Thus I conclude that luck egalitarianism cannot uphold justice in health.

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por Lasse Nielsen

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